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to Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985). All attempts to resolve the controversy empirically face 
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number of performance indicators to estimate a player’s talent according to his contribution 
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“The phenomenon of Superstars, wherein relatively small numbers of people 
earn enormous amounts of money and dominate the activities in which they 
engage, seems to be increasingly important in the modern world” (Rosen 1981, 
845, own emphasis). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The opening sentence of Sherwin Rosen’s seminal paper “The Economics of 
Superstars” today applies more than ever. Technological change has enlarged the scope and 
the intensity of so-called winner-takes-all markets in the last decades. The central question 
addressed in this paper is: What does it take to be a superstar? Why do some artists, media 
stars, professional athletes or executives earn disproportionately high salaries while others 
receive comparably low remuneration? In the literature, there are basically two competing—
but not mutually exclusive—theories of superstar formation proposed by Rosen (1981) and 
Adler (1985).1 While Sherwin Rosen explains how small differences in talent translate into 
large differences in earnings, Moshe Adler argues that superstars might even emerge among 
equally talented performers due to the positive network externalities of popularity. Empirical 
tests of the different driving forces of superstar salaries have proved to be very difficult 
because an objective measure of a star’s talent is often hard to find and even harder to 
quantify (Krueger 2005). For example, what are the talent characteristics of a pop music star? 
The literature offers different approaches. Hamlen (1991, 1994) uses the physical concept of 
“voice quality”, which measures the frequency of harmonic content that singers use when 
they sing the word “love” in one of their songs—but does this really matter for pop music? 
Krueger (2005) measures star quality by the number of millimeters of print columns devoted 
to each artist in The Rolling Stone Encyclopedia of Rock & Roll. Nevertheless, as he admits, 
this measure reflects the subjective importance the editors of the Encyclopedia implicitly 
devote to each artist, which may correlate both with the artist’s talent and with his/her 
popularity. In team production settings, the difficulty of accurately measuring star talent is 
even more intense, as individual contributions to team output is mostly unclear. However, the 
empirical relevance of stars within teams is undoubted. Star CEOs in top management teams, 
lead singers of rock bands or star athletes on sports teams are just a few examples of 
superstars embedded in teams. 
                                                
1 There are, of course, other superstar theories as well (e.g. MacDonald 1988; Kremer 1993; Frank and 
Cook, 1995; or Borghans and Groot 1998). The basic principles of Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985) have 
remained omnipresent, however. 
2 
This paper argues that rank-order tournaments in professional sports allow a more 
accurate determination of talent than occurs in the arts. In individual sports, direct 
competitions help ascertaining the most talented athletes. The common rules of the game 
have the character of a fixed effect that allows relative evaluations (Frick 2003). Even though 
each athlete’s performance is also affected by random causes, it can typically be assumed that 
the most talented athlete enjoys the highest probability of winning. In team sports, however, 
teams and not individual players compete in rank-order tournaments. As we examine 
superstars in a team production setting, namely in professional soccer, we first estimate a 
team production function to identify the playing characteristics that significantly influence 
the probability of a team winning. In doing so, we use the detailed statistics of the Opta 
Sports Data Company, which quantifies and qualifies every touch of the ball during the game 
by each player. In a second step, we use the individual performance statistics of all variables 
that have proved to be critical for winning as indicators of the player’s talent and estimate the 
impact of talent, popularity and various controls on the player’s market value, employing 
individual panel data from the highest German soccer league. A player’s popularity is 
measured by the annual press publicity he receives in over 20 different newspapers and 
magazines, purged of positive influences of field performance so that our popularity indicator 
captures the non-performance-related celebrity status of a player. Since we define superstars 
as a relatively small number of players at the top end of the league’s market value 
distribution, we run different quantile regressions that allow us to characterize a particular 
point in the conditional distribution. We find empirical evidence that both talent and non-
performance-related popularity increase the market values of soccer stars. The marginal 
influence of talent is magnified near the top end of scale, as postulated by Rosen’s star 
theory. While one additional goal scored increases a player’s market value by €0.06 million 
at the mean, the impact increases to €0.25 million at the 95% quantile. Using team revenue 
data, we find that the magnitude of the talent effect is plausible given the large returns to 
scale in German soccer.  
Our focus differs from that of previous literature that examines the relationship between 
star attraction and team revenues2 and from papers that estimate individual marginal revenue 
                                                
2 See, e.g., Hausman and Leonard (1997); Mullin and Dunn (2002); Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2004); or 
Brandes, Franck, and Nüesch (2008). 
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products.3 Instead, we investigate the relationship between a star’s characteristics and his 
labor market demand.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two illustrates the two 
alternative theories of superstar formation and their hypotheses. Section three presents the 
related empirical literature. In section four, we explain the difficulty of adequately measuring 
talent and the advantages the sports industry offers. Subsequently, we test the relevance of 
numerous field performance measures as talent indicators. The popularity measure is 
explicated in section five. Section six includes the main empirical analysis that relates the 
stars’ market values to their characteristics before we conduct a few sensitivity analyses in 
section seven. The last section discusses results and possible implications. 
 
II. THEORIES OF SUPERSTAR FORMATION 
Alfred Marshall (1947) has already pointed out that innovations in technology and mass 
production will lower the per-unit price of quality goods and ultimately allow higher-quality 
goods to obtain a greater market share. In 1981, Sherwin Rosen named this effect the 
“superstar phenomenon”. Extraordinary salaries earned by superstars are driven by a market 
equilibrium that rewards talented people with increasing returns to ability. The key to the 
high earnings of superstars lies in the vast audience they are able to reach due to scale 
economies. Superstars arise in markets in which the production technology allows for joint 
consumption. For example, if one person watches a tennis game on television, this does not 
diminish someone else’s opportunity to watch it as well. In superstar industries production 
costs do not rise in proportion to the size of the seller’s market. This enables a few or just one 
supplier to serve the whole market. 
However, large economies of scale do not guarantee high salaries for a small number of 
stars unless the market demand becomes highly concentrated on their services. In the 
superstar literature, the demand for superstar services is basically driven by two distinct but 
not mutually exclusive factors: superior talent, according to Rosen (1981), and network 
externalities of popularity, according to Adler (1985). 
Firstly, market demand may be concentrated on superstars due to their superior talent. 
Rosen (1981) argues that poorer quality is only an imperfect substitute for higher quality. 
                                                
3 A prominent example is the paper of Scully (1974). 
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Thus, people prefer consuming fewer high-quality services to more of the same service at 
moderate quality levels: “(…) hearing a succession of mediocre singers does not add up to a 
single outstanding performance” (Rosen 1981, 846). Most people tend not to be satisfied with 
the performance of a less talented but cheaper artist when they are able to enjoy a top 
performance, even if the costs are somewhat higher (Frey 1998). This sort of imperfect 
substitutability applies in particular to status goods or gifts: To celebrate a special occasion, 
people search not for an average restaurant meal or bottle of wine, but for the best (Frank and 
Cook 1995). According to Rosen (1981), small differences in talent among performers are 
magnified into large earnings differentials. Rosen stars are simply better than their rivals. In 
professional sports, they attract fans with their outstanding performances. 
Network externalities of popularity offer a second explanation of why demand may be 
highly focused on the services of a few superstars. In contrast to the typical standardization 
literature4, the network externalities of superstars are not confined to issues of technological 
compatibility or a larger variety of complements. Moshe Adler, rather, suggests a cognitive 
and social form of network externalities. Adler (1985) argues that the marginal utility from 
consuming a superstar service increases with the ability to appreciate it, which depends not 
only on the star’s talent, but also on the amount of star-specific knowledge the consumer has 
acquired. This specific knowledge—called consumption capital—is accumulated through 
past consumption activities or by discussing the star’s performance with likewise 
knowledgeable individuals. The latter effect gives rise to positive network externalities. The 
more popular the artist is, the easier it becomes to find other fans. Searching cost economies 
imply that consumers are better off patronizing the most popular star as long as others are not 
perceived as clearly superior. 
“Stardom is a market device to economize on learning costs in activities 
where “the more you know the more you enjoy.” Thus stardom may be 
independent of the existence of a hierarchy of talent” (Adler 1985, 208-209). 
According to Adler (1985), luck (by luck, he means factors other than talent) 
determines who amongst equally talented artist will snowball into a star. Superstars may 
emerge because initially (slightly) more people happen to know one artist than any other in a 
group of artists of possibly equal talent. However, more than twenty years later, Adler (2006) 
dismisses the idea of luck as the only possible mechanism driving the initial selection from 
among equally talented people. Future superstars do not usually entrust this choice to pure 
                                                
4 See, e.g., Katz and Shapiro (1985) or Farrell and Saloner (1985). 
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chance. Instead, they consciously use publicity, such as appearances on talk shows and 
coverage in tabloids, magazines, newspapers, and the Internet to signal and strengthen their 
popularity. Adler (2006) emphasizes that consumption capital is acquired not only through 
past consumption activities and discussions but also by reading about the star’s performance 
in newspapers, in magazines and on the Internet. On the one hand, publicity directly reduces 
the costs of learning about star services; on the other hand, it is also a good indicator of the 
star’s popularity in society. 
Both Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985) agree that superstars provide services of superior 
perceived quality. But whereas according to Rosen (1981) the star’s talent alone determines 
the perceived quality, Adler (1985) argues that factors other than talent, like popularity, 
matter too. Thus, Adler’s superstar theory does not contradict Rosen’s star model but rather 
supplements it. In team sports, for example, superstars may have personal appeal or charisma, 
an element that activates fan interest even after controlling for their contribution to the team’s 
(increased) playing quality. 
 
III. RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
In this section, we give an introduction to the existing empirical literature on superstar 
emergence. A first body of literature relates star remuneration to talent proxies but does not 
include separate explanatory variables distinguishing the Adler effect. 
Hamlen (1991 and 1994) empirically tests Rosen’s superstar assumption that small 
differences in talent become magnified into disproportional levels of financial success in the 
popular music industry. He uses the harmonic content of the singer’s voice as a talent 
measure. Harmonic content is a clearly quantifiable variable that measures the “richness” and 
“depth” of the singer’s voice (Hamlen 1991, 731). When controlling for other factors like 
gender, race, type of music, and career duration, he shows that the estimated elasticity of 
record sales to “voice quality” is significantly greater than zero but less than one. Thus, he 
fails to find a magnification effect.5 In his 1994 paper, Hamlen finds that the single market 
acts as an (imperfect) “quality” filter for the albums market. Hence, a representative 
consumer is more likely to purchase albums by singers who have already been successful in 
                                                
5 Krueger (2005) objects that Hamlen’s interpretation of the low elasticity as a rejection of Rosen’s star 
model might be wrong, because it is unclear whether the scaling of units of quality is appropriate and that the 
elasticity may be above 1 when using a different scaling. 
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the singles market. This filtering process is imperfect, however, which is in line with Adler’s 
superstar theory. 
Frick (2001) and Lucifora and Simmons (2003) use data from professional team sports 
to analyze stars. Frick (2001) finds evidence to support Rosen’s explanation of superstars, 
showing that performance measures like numbers of scores, rebounds, steals, assists and 
blocks will predict the rising salary differentials of basketball players in the National 
Basketball Association (NBA). The same applies to scores and assists by hockey players in 
the National Hockey League (NHL). Lucifora and Simmons (2003) investigate wage 
determination among professional soccer players appearing in the Italian league. They show 
that talent—measured by the number of goals and assists scored per game—exercises 
significant influence on the skewness of the salary distribution of forwards and midfield 
players.  
As already mentioned in the introduction, Krueger (2005) uses a rather novel approach 
to measure the star quality of rock & roll musicians: number of millimeters of print in 
columns devoted to each artist in The Rolling Stone Encyclopedia of Rock & Roll. Although 
this is a subjective measure, the number of millimeters of print still has the virtue of 
reflecting the importance that the editors of the Encyclopedia implicitly attach to each artist. 
Thus, it might be correlated with both the artist’s talent and with his/her popularity. Krueger 
(2005) finds evidence that the returns to superstardom in terms of ticket price, annual revenue 
and revenue per show have increased over time due to technology changes. 
Since any objective quality is surely multidimensional, a second body of related 
empirical literature does not even attempt to locate appropriate ability indicators but instead 
tests whether market outcomes could be merely the result of a probability mechanism 
determining that “outputs will be concentrated among a few lucky individuals” (Chung and 
Cox 1994, 771, emphasis in original). This concept is, in its spirit, similar to the ideas of 
Adler (1985). Schulze (2003) criticizes this body of literature because the question regarding 
the underlying reason for a consumer’s decision to buy a star’s service remains unanswered.  
Using a stochastic model by Yule (1924) and Simon (1955) as a representation of the 
consumer’s choice behavior, Chung and Cox (1994) show that the superstar phenomenon 
does not require talent differentials. They argue that the very large incomes of superstars in 
the popular music industry are driven by sheer fortune rather than by superior talent. Luck 
initially increases popularity and triggers a self-reinforcing bandwagon effect.  
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Giles (2006) contradicts the findings of Chung and Cox (1994), as he does not find 
evidence that either the lifetime or the quantity of number-one hits in the US popular music 
industry is spread according to the Yule distribution. He leaves open whether Rosen’s or 
Adler’s superstar explanation is relevant to the music industry and agrees with Connoly and 
Krueger (2006, 696) that the “inherent difficulty of objectively measuring talent or quality in 
a meaningful metric apart from economic success” is one of the main obstacles to testing 
superstar theories. 
Instead of explaining remuneration or any other outcome variables as based on 
characteristics of the superstar, Crain and Tollison (2002) regress the artist concentration in a 
market on several socio-demographic factors like the teenage share of population, the death 
rate of active-duty military or the inflation rate. They find, for example, that the teenage share 
of the population increases the market concentration in popular music. Younger consumers 
have a longer consumption horizon, which strengthens the incentives to switch to the 
superstar and abandon the non-star. Thus, the skewness of the market outcomes in the 
popular music industry is driven by the fact that consumers are economizing on costly 
consumption capital, which is in line with Adler’s conception of superstar emergence. But, as 
stated above, Crain and Tollison (2002) do not control for quality differentials, even though 
they admit that some underlying and objective measures of quality differences are essential to 
the test of both the Rosen and the Adler hypothesis. 
A third body of related literature uses both talent and popularity proxies in its empirical 
framework. Lehmann and Schulze (2008), as well as Franck and Nüesch (2008), test the 
influence of field performance and media publicity on the emergence of superstars in German 
soccer. Regressing salary proxies of 359 players on three performance measures (goals, 
assists and tackles) and the number of citations in the online version of the soccer magazine 
Kicker, Lehmann and Schulze (2008) discover that neither performance nor publicity can 
explain the salaries of superstars in the 95% quantile. Franck and Nüesch (2008) find 
contrary evidence; not only talent—measured by expert opinions—but also popularity 
increases the demand for star players. Both Lehmann und Schulze (2008) and Franck and 
Nüesch (2008) use cross-sectional samples and consider the talent indicators as exogenously 
given without proving their relevance for a soccer game. 
Salganik, Dodds and Watts (2006) used an experimental study to investigate both the 
talent and the popularity hypothesis in an artificial cultural market. 14,341 participants 
downloaded previously unknown songs either with or without knowledge regarding previous 
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participants’ choices. The participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions distinguished only by the availability of information on the previous choices of 
others. Salganik et al. (2006) show that the information regarding the choices of others 
contributes to both the inequality and the unpredictability of the artificial music market. 
Social influence increases the skewness of the market distribution and the unpredictability of 
success. The latter is analyzed as the extent to which two “worlds” with identical songs, 
identical initial conditions, and indistinguishable populations generate different outcomes. 
Since the outcome is unpredictable even when consumers had no knowledge about download 
statistics, they conclude that no measure of a song’s quality can precisely predict success. 
 
IV. TALENT DETERMINATION 
If one conclusion may be drawn from the existing superstar literature, it is the 
recognition of not only the difficulty but also the necessity of finding accurate talent 
measures in order to distinguish between Rosen’s and Adler’s star concepts. Throsby (1994, 
19) writes: 
“While it is quite plausible to take estimated earnings functions and to 
attribute at least some of the (often large) unexplained residual to differences in 
talent, such a hypothesis remains untestable when no independent measure of 
talent is forthcoming.” 
Hamlen (1994, 405) calls a “sour grapes conclusion” any conclusion drawn when 
scholars believe they have found empirical evidence of the superstar phenomenon by 
examining only measures of success and failing to compare these to some objective and 
external measure of quality or ability. “A proper test of the superstar phenomenon requires 
that the measure of “quality” (“ability”) be an external measure.” (Hamlen 1994, 399). 
The first issue in terms of talent determination is its validity. While some pop fans love 
the music of Madonna, others may hate it. In the popular music industry, talent is hard to 
define. Some music appeals to a subset of listeners but not to others because, in the arts, there 
is “an intrinsically subjective component to quality” (Connolly and Krueger 2006, 697). Both 
Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985), however, assume identical consumers who demand an equal 
unspecified artistic activity. They argue that diversity of tastes does not change the basic 
mechanisms of superstar formation but simply confines a sellers’ market. Consumers of 
similar taste constitute a market with its own stars. As stated previously, Hamlen (1991) uses 
the harmonic content of the voice as a singer’s talent indicator. Still, does harmonic content 
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of the voice really matter? In classical music or opera, presumably yes. In the case of pop or 
rock music, however, we have strong doubts about the relevance of harmonic content of the 
voice. More important factors for the success of such singers are probably charm, sex appeal, 
or the show on stage. Hence, one possibility for dealing with heterogeneous tastes is to use 
specific talent indicators only within a genre: otherwise, how is it possible to compare a 
chamber orchestra with a heavy metal band? Nevertheless, quality perceptions often differ 
even within a particular genre. 
A second obstacle experienced in the context of empirical superstar studies is the 
measurement of talent. The absence of “natural units” for measuring talent is a major 
limitation of empirical superstar studies in the arts (Connoly and Krueger 2006). Even if all 
pop fans agreed that charisma on stage is the most important ability of a pop star, scholars 
would still face the difficulty of capturing charisma on a metrical scale. Talent is inherent and 
thus hard to quantify. 
In professional sports, the empirical problems described above are less serious because 
valid talent measures are easier to find than in other fields like the arts or entertainment 
activities (Schulze 2003). In professional sports, the winners are determined by a set of well-
established tournaments relying either on objective quality indicators like goal scoring and/or 
on institutionalized voting procedures by proven expert judges. Rank-order tournaments in 
professional sports may be considered a mechanism for identifying an athlete’s talent. 
Although different effort levels and uncontrollable factors like wrong referee decisions or 
pure luck might also affect the final result, the competition is generally won by the most 
talented athlete. Since innate talent is unobservable, Rosen (1981) argues that any cardinal 
measure of talent must rely on measurements of actual outcomes. In individual sports, the 
probability of winning is this sort of measurable outcome and serves, therefore, as a good 
indicator of the athlete’s talent. Even though a high likelihood of winning marks high 
sportive success, it does not necessarily imply enormous salaries as well. Or inversely, even 
less talented and thus less successful athletes might earn superstar wages.6 So, there is no 
danger of a tautological Rosen star definition. 
                                                
6 The Russian tennis player Anna Kournikova serves as a good illustration here. She did not achieve any 
significant success in single tournaments and her overall single ranking was never better than eight. 
Nevertheless, in 2002 she was the second highest earner in female tennis behind Venus Williams, the number 
one at the time. In Kournikova’s case, sponsorships and other lucrative commercial opportunities have arisen 
not from a consistent record of successful performances on the tennis court, but instead as a consequence of an 
image of sexual attractiveness and an associated media profile.  
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Analyzing stardom in team production settings, talent determination is more complex. 
It requires a proper evaluation of the team production technology because teams—and not 
individuals—compete in rank-order tournaments. In this paper, the (Rosen) talent of a soccer 
star is considered the player’s ability to increase the winning chances of his team. Thus, talent 
represents pure on-the-field prowess. Other fan attraction abilities of stars like celebrity status 
or being a pop icon are, as Adler (1985, 211) writes, “factors other than talent”. Defining 
talent as the ability to increase the team’s winning probability, we first need to estimate 
individual contributions to the team output. In doing so, we make use of a large series of 
performance categories (e.g., shots at goal, passes, clearances, tackles, or dribbles) provided 
by the Opta Sports Data Company, which quantifies and qualifies every touch of the ball by 
each player during the game based on live and off-tape analysis of every match by a team of 
specialist analysts.  
Using data for all games in the highest German soccer league during five seasons 
(2001/02 – 2005/06), we empirically estimate a team production function in order to identify 
all playing elements that significantly increase (or reduce) the team’s winning probability. 
Unlike in many estimations of team production in professional sports,7 we do not estimate a 
player’s marginal product or coaching efficiency, rates of monopsonistic exploitation, racial 
discrimination or any other important issue in labor economics. We simply identify 
significant correlations between various performance characteristics and winning in order to 
capture the dimensions of soccer talent.  
Winning a soccer game is directly linked to the number of goals scored in relation to 
the number of goals conceded. Thus, team performance is measured in terms of the final 
score expressed as the goal differential. Team  wins the game if it scores more goals  than 
the opposition team . If the goal differential is zero, the teams have tied, and if the goal 
difference is negative, team  has lost. Inspired by Carmichael et al. (2000), we construct a 
team production function where the goal difference ( ) is determined by a vector of 
differences of play variables ( ), team fixed effects for both competing teams ( ), 
a dummy variable indicating whether team  is playing at home ( ) and an error term 
( ): 
 (1) 
                                                
7 See, e.g., Scully (1974), Zak, Huan, and Siegfried (1979), Blass (1992), Berri (1999), or Carmichael, 
Thomas, and Ward (2000). 
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While the dummy variable  captures a potential home-field advantage, the 
team fixed effects account for any unobserved team characteristics that may influence the 
game’s result beyond the analyzed play variables. The common occurrence of zero values for 
the dependent (e.g., scoreless draw results) and independent variables requires that the field 
performance variables be expressed as differences between the two opposing teams instead of 
ratios and that the production function be linearly specified instead of employing a 
multiplicative model.8 We do not estimate separate models for goals scored  and goals 
conceded , as soccer is—unlike, for example, baseball—a very interactive game in which 
success is achieved through the constant mutual cooperation of both offensive and defensive 
players.9  
With 18 teams each playing each other twice during the season, the full season fixture 
in the highest German soccer league includes 306 games generating 612 individual team 
performance observations. Since the dataset comprehends five seasons (2001/02-2005/06), 
we have 3060 team performances in 1530 games. However, only half of the observations are 
used to avoid double counting. Each of the 1530 observations relates to a different fixture, 
and for each season, the total is equally divided between home and away teams as well as 
between all participating teams in order to prevent selection bias.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 illustrates the variables and the descriptive statistics of the different play 
variables used to estimate equation 1. We group the different performance measures offered 
by the Opta Sports Data Company in attacking plays, defensive plays, efficiency plays and 
aggressive plays. Since the likelihood of goal scoring is directly linked to shots at goal, all 
three attacking variables concern different “qualities” of shots at goal. While the number of 
shots on target and shots hitting the (goal net) woodwork are expected to be a sign of high 
                                                
8 We are aware that the assumption of additive separability of the playing statistics is problematic in soccer 
due to the high degree of interaction. Thus, we also tried to use seasonal data to prevent the issue of zero 
numbers (which is a necessary condition for using a double-logged, multiplicative model). However, even on 
the seasonal level, some of the variables have zero values (e.g., the number of red cards or balls dropped by the 
goalkeeper). 
9 However, separate models, in which the number of goals scored (conceded) is explained by (the opposing 
team’s) attacking strength and the opposing team’s (own) defensive quality, would provide qualitatively similar 
results.   
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attacking quality, the impact of shots off target is ambiguous. On the one hand, it might be an 
indicator of high attacking pressure and a lot of goal scoring opportunities and attempts; on 
the other hand, it may also be a sign of low efficiency in goal scoring. The four variables 
characterizing defensive quality are the number of clearances, blocks and interceptions, the 
saves to shots ratio by the goalkeeper, the number of times the ball was caught by the 
goalkeeper and number of times the ball was dropped by the goalkeeper. The first variable 
reflects the ability to block and intercept the opposition’s passes and shots and to clear the 
ball from pressure situations, while the last three defensive play variables address the playing 
talent of the goalkeepers, which incorporates the ability to save shots and to catch balls 
instead of dropping them. In addition, we test the influence of five different efficiency plays: 
the success rates for passes, flicks, crossings, dribblings and tackles, which should exert a 
positive influence on winning. The success rate is defined as the percentage of passes, flicks 
or crossings to one’s own teammates in relation to the total of passes, flicks or crossings. 
Successful dribbling is dribbling in which the player is able to retain possession of the ball, 
whereas a successful tackle is a situation in which the player is able to snatch the ball from 
the other team. The last group includes aggressive plays. The numbers of red and yellow 
cards are expected to decrease the team’s probability of winning. To be sent off the field by 
receiving a red card not only reduces the number of fielded players, but is also likely to have 
negative implications for overall team effectiveness. The magnitude of the effect of receiving 
a yellow card is expected to be smaller, as the player is just warned and may therefore play 
less intensely for the rest of the game. The other four variables indicate the team’s differences 
in terms of fouls and hands, which may have ambiguous effects on the probability of 
winning. In a negative sense, such infringements may indicate an inability to deal with 
attacking pressure and/or lack of discipline. On the other hand, fouls may also prevent an 
opposing team from creating or taking advantage of scoring opportunities (Carmichael et al., 
2000). We distinguish between three areas in which a foul is conceded: fouls conceded in the 
penalty area, in one’s own third of the playing area, and not in one’s own third of the playing 
field. Whereas fouls in the penalty area are expected to decrease the team’s winning 
probability, the signs of the effects of fouls outside the penalty area are unclear a priori.  
Due to the issue of multicollinearity, we did not include all variables that are provided 
by the Opta Sports Data Company. Two examples: Opta measures the number of key passes 
defined as passes leading to goal shots. Even though this information is of high interest and 
certainly impacts goal scoring, we did not include this information in our model because it is 
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highly correlated with shots on and off target or hitting the (goal net) woodwork. Secondly, 
some of the attacking variables like shots on target have a very high correlation with some of 
the defense characteristics like saved shots by the opposite goalkeeper. The correlations 
between the chosen independent variables are below 0.6, and the mean variance inflation 
factor (VIF) is well below 2. The following Table 2 illustrates the estimation results of 
equation 1. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
We find evidence that team success is positively associated with shots on target and 
negatively related to shots off target. Thus, it seems that the quality and accuracy of shooting 
is more important than the pure number of shot attempts. Shots hitting the woodwork do not 
significantly affect team performance. The number of clearances, blocks and interceptions, as 
well as the saves to shots ratio by the goalkeeper, clearly increases the winning chances by 
preventing goal scoring on the part of the opposing team. The other defensive plays have no 
significant influence on the dependent variable. Regarding the efficiency plays, we see that 
the percentage of successful crossings has the highest impact on winning. The estimated 
coefficients of the other efficiency plays are not statistically significant. The infringement 
variables, red and yellow cards, appear as predicted with negative coefficients. The effect of a 
foul depends on where the foul is conceded. Whereas a foul causing a penalty significantly 
reduces the team’s probability of winning, fouls outside the penalty area have no distinct 
impact on winning. The latter also applies to the number of hands.  
We consider all individual field plays that have been proven to significantly affect the 
team’s winning probability as characteristics of the unobserved talent of a player. The 
individual number of goals and assists, which are by definition directly related to the team’s 
sportive performance, are used as talent indicators as well.10 In the next section, we explain 
how we measure the non-performance-related popularity of a player before both talent and 
popularity are related to the player’s market value.  
 
                                                
10 Even though goals are strongly associated with, e.g., shots on target on the team level, the same does not 
necessarily hold on the individual level. Thus, we do not introduce systematic multicollinearity. 
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V. NON-PERFORMANCE-RELATED POPULARITY  
In line with Adler (2006) we proxy a player’s popularity based on press publicity. 
Using the LexisNexis database, which contains more than 20 different quality nationwide 
newspapers (including Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, Hamburger Abendblatt, Die Welt, taz, Berliner Morgenpost, Financial Times 
Deutschland) as well as weekly magazines (including Der Spiegel, Stern, Bunte), we count 
the number of articles in which a player is mentioned at least once. The search string included 
the first and last names of the player, as well as the name of the club he was engaged by 
during the corresponding season, starting from July 1st at the beginning of the season and 
lasting until the 30th of June at the end of the season.  
As talent is measured by the player’s field performance and popularity by the player’s 
press publicity, the concepts of talent and popularity are likely to be positively correlated due 
to performance-related publicity. A top goal scorer usually enjoys more media attention than 
do players with mediocre field performance. In order to clearly differentiate between Rosen’s 
and Adler’s superstar theory, we need, however, a popularity measure that is unrelated to the 
performance of the player. Thus, we proxy a player’s non-performance-related star attraction 
by the residuals  of the following equation,  
, (2) 
where the logarithm of articles mentioning the player’s name is regressed on the critical 
individual field performance measures  according to the previous section.11 The ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation results of equation 2 are illustrated in Table 10 in the 
appendix of this paper. Most field performance measures significantly increase press 
coverage, with the highest magnitudes for goals, the saves to shots ratio, and assists. The 
residuals of equation 2 characterize a player’s publicity that cannot be explained by his 
sportive performance on the pitch; for example, media publicity that is a result of the star 
having an affair or consciously presenting himself not only as a soccer star but as a pop icon 
as well.12  
                                                
11 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for proposing this procedure.  
12 The ceteris paribus condition in multiple regression analysis is technically the same as if one were to 
introduce the residuals of a regression of the considered explanatory variable on all other explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge 2003, 78-79). The estimated popularity effect would therefore be the same if we directly 
introduced the logarithm of press citations into the model. The size of the talent effect would be comparably 
lower, however, as the positive correlation with performance-related popularity would be partialed out. By 
introducing the non-performance-related publicity of a player that—per construction—does not correlate with a 
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VI. SUPERSTAR DETERMINANTS  
Data sample and dependent variable 
The different theories of superstar formation are tested using panel data for players 
appearing in the highest German soccer league during five seasons (2001/02 until 2005/06). 
Whereas a lot of detailed statistics on individual productivity are available for players in top 
European leagues, individual salary data are (unlike for the US Major Leagues) not available, 
unfortunately. German soccer clubs are not required to publish player salaries. In 1995, the 
well-respected soccer magazine Kicker, however, began to publish estimates of the market 
values of the players appearing in the highest German soccer league. Since the market value 
proxies have been estimated in a systematic manner for several years by an almost identical, 
qualified editorial board, they are likely to be consistent and have, therefore, been used in 
several empirical studies so far (e.g., Hübl and Swieter 2002; Haas, Kocher, and Sutter 2004; 
Eschweiler and Vieth 2004; Kern and Süssmuth 2005; Torgler and Schmidt 2007; Torgler, 
Schaffner, Schmidt, and Frey 2008; Schmidt, Torgler, and Frey 2009). In line with most of 
the previous studies,13 we also use the market value proxies provided by the Kicker soccer 
magazine. Kicker is the only source that provides systematic panel data, and its reliability is 
judged to be high in the review articles of Torgler and Schmidt (2007) and Frick (2007). We 
additionally test the reliability of the market value data by comparing a Kicker subsample 
with a cross-section of market values provided by a second independent source, namely the 
webpage www.transfermarkt.de. The market value proxies of the two sources are highly 
correlated (correlation is 0.89), and the estimation results are very similar if the 
Transfermarkt data is employed, as we show in our first sensitivity analysis in section VII of 
this paper. The fact that separate regressions using different data sources lead to the same 
results increases confidence in the reliability of our results. 
Mentioning the examples of full-time comedians and soloists, Rosen (1981) considered 
stars as individual service providers with enormous earnings. The earnings of painters, 
authors or athletes in individual sports are directly determined by the market potential of their 
                                                                                                                                                  
player’s performance, we are able to estimate unrestricted talent effects. In other words, we use the residuals of 
equation 2 as measure of a player’s popularity because we want to net out the influence of performance on 
publicity, but not the other way around. 
13 Other studies use cross-sectional samples of remuneration estimates of players from the 1999/00 season 
published in Welt am Sonntag (Lehmann and Weigand 1999), in Sportbild (Lehmann and Schulze 2008), or on 
the webpage www.transfermarkt.de (Eschweiler and Vieth 2004; Franck and Nüesch 2008). 
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services. So, market value and remuneration are, generally speaking, the same. In our case, 
superstars cannot provide the service alone. Soccer stars are part of teams and receive certain 
salary payments, bonuses or signing fees that do no longer necessarily correspond to their 
market potential. The predetermined (base) salary, for example, does not increase if the 
player exhibits excellent field performance. Bonus payments are typically contingent on a 
large set of confidential terms and conditions. Signing fees or transfer values depend (among 
other factors) on the bargaining power of the buying and selling club. Thus, market values 
should better reflect the value generation potential of a player than pure salaries. The Kicker 
market value proxies incorporate not only salaries but also signing fees, bonuses, transfer 
fees, and possibly even a remaining producer surplus. However, the market value proxies do 
not include individual endorsement fees. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 reveals a rather normally distributed density function for the log10 of market 
values. In line with Rosen (1981), we define superstars as the players at the top end of the 
market value distribution. As Rosen (1981) does not state whether the 2%, 5% or 10% most 
valuable players are defined as superstars, we run different quantile regressions that describe 
different points at the top end of the distribution. While the median player is valued at €1.25 
million, star players at the 95% quantile are exchanged for €5.5 million (see Table 3). 75% of 
the players in the highest German soccer league have a market value of one million Euros 
and above. Table 3 illustrates the market values at different quantiles. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
For the empirical model, we use the natural logarithm of the market values expressed in 
Euros and adjusted for inflation. During the considered time frame (2001 until 2005), the 
players’ market values have remained rather stationary in German soccer.   
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Control Variables 
Besides the indicators of individual talent and popularity described in sections IV and 
V, we also use several control variables to eliminate alternative explanations, such as age, 
experience, tactical position, and team effects. An overview of all variables is given in Table 
4. Since several studies (e.g., Lucifora and Simmons 2003; Torgler and Schmidt 2007) show 
that a soccer player’s age has a positive but diminishing impact on salaries, we control for 
age and age squared. In addition, we hold the number of present and past appearances in the 
highest German league constant to account for the experience of a player.14 Furthermore, we 
incorporate team dummies, as (unobserved) team heterogeneity may exert a significant 
influence on a player’s market value (Idson and Kahane 2000). Somebody who is on the 
squad of the team that wins the championship enjoys much greater publicity and financial 
rewards than someone on a team that is relegated to the next lower league. Position dummies 
are used to control for specific effects resulting from the tactical position of a player. 
Lehmann and Weigand (1999) find evidence that midfielders earn significantly more money 
than players in other tactical positions.15  
Since the Kicker soccer magazine publishes the estimated market values at the 
beginning of a new season, we use the values of the next season as dependent variable. This 
implies that we have missing observations for the dependent variable whenever a player 
leaves the league because Kicker estimates the market values only for the players engaged by 
a top-division German team. If so-called sample attrition is driven by unobservable factors 
that also influence the dependent variable in the main equation, our estimates may be 
distorted by selection bias. Thus, the validity of the results largely depends on whether the 
attrition status is random after conditioning on a vector of covariates. In the following, we 
want to test this requirement. 
                                                
14 We also tested for a possible influence of the contractual status of the player by introducing a dummy 
variable denoted as 1 if the contract ends at the end of the season and a second dummy variable denoted as 1 if 
the player contract ends at the end of the next season. However, none of the controls had a significant impact on 
market values nor changed the other coefficients in any significant way. The relationship between a player’s 
contract duration and his market value is controversial: some scholars, like Lehn (1982) and Scoggins (1993), 
conjecture that guaranteed multi-year contracts reduce player performance due to a moral-hazard effect, while 
others like Kahn (1993) and Maxcy (2004) argue that only the better players receive comparably long contracts 
(positive self-selection effect).  
15 Whereas the positional dummies just control for different salary levels depending on the tactical position 
of a player, we allow for different talent and popularity effects to be experienced by offensive and defensive star 
players in the third sensitivity analysis in section VII.  
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Let us denote  as an attrition dummy equal to 1 if the observation is missing its 
value of  due to attrition and 0 if not. Then, selection bias occurs if the probability 
function of  conditional on the dependent variable and the regressors is not equal to the 
probability function conditional on the regressors alone (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt 
1998). Thus:  
. (3) 
As  is not observable if , equation 3 cannot be tested directly. However, with 
panel data, we can use the individual means of the dependent variable (see also Fitzgerald et 
al. 1998). Hence, potential selection bias is tested by estimating a probit equation of a non-
response in season  conditional on the individual means of the dependent variable ( ) and 
conditional on observable factors . If the coefficient of  is significantly different from 
zero, the assumption of “selection on observables” will no longer be satisfied. We estimate: 
, (4) 
where  is a vector of covariates. In addition to the variables measuring a player’s 
talent, popularity and various controls, we also include a dummy variable RELEGATION 
that equals 1 if the player’s team is demoted and 0 otherwise. In German soccer, the weakest 
three teams, including most of the squad members, are relegated to the next lower league and, 
therefore, drop out of the sample. Estimating equation 4, we find that  is not 
statistically different form zero (p-value = 0.15). The probit regression results (illustrated in 
Table 11 in the appendix) additionally show that players engaged in relegated teams have a 
significantly higher likelihood of dropping out of the sample. Hence, we draw two 
conclusions. First, we must introduce the relegation dummy into the main regression because 
this affects selection beyond the talent and popularity variables of a player. Second, after 
introducing this additional control variable, attrition is no longer selective on the individual 
specific means of the dependent variable. Furthermore, potential remaining negative 
selectivity is appeased by the fact that we specifically concentrate on star players at the upper 
quantiles, who are unlikely to leave the league given the (insignificant) negative coefficient 
 in equation 4. Table 4 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the variables we use for the 
market value regressions.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
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Identification Strategy 
A standard approach is to specify the unknown parameters of a linear regression using 
the method of OLS or least absolute deviation (LAD). Both methods lead to an 
approximation to the mean (OLS) or median (LAD) and represent the “central” tendency of a 
conditional distribution. However, they tell little about tail behavior. The OLS procedure will 
therefore not be able to capture the superstar phenomenon correctly. The quantile regression 
approach, originally developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), allows one to characterize a 
particular point in the conditional (asymmetric) distribution. It minimizes an asymmetrically 
weighted sum of absolute errors where the weights are functions of the quantile of interest 
( ): 
. (5) 
The application of quantile methods to panel data is not unproblematic (Koenker 2004). 
Whereas, in the linear regression model, fixed effects methods can account for the constant 
unobserved heterogeneity of a player as a linear intercept, quantile regressions require a 
constant distributional individual effect. If the number of time periods is high and the number 
of cross-sectional observations is low, the estimation of such a distributional individual effect 
is possible by including cross-sectional dummies (Koenker 2004). In our setting, however, 
the inclusion of player dummies would clearly lead to the incidental parameters problem, as 
we have a large number of cross-sectional observations and only one to five time periods. We 
therefore use a pooled regression approach to estimate the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable. As the observations of the same player are unlikely to be independent, 
the standard asymptotic-variance formula (Koenker and Basset 1978) and the standard 
bootstrap approach to estimating standard errors cannot be applied. Instead, a given bootstrap 
sample is created by repeatedly drawing (with replacements) the same player from the sample 
of players. In doing so, we allow for serial error correlation between the observations of the 
same player. As we run 1000 bootstrap replications, the estimates of the robust standard 
errors are rather stable (Koenker and Hallock 2000). 
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Results 
Table 5 illustrates the estimation results. Besides three different quantile regressions, 
we also present the pooled OLS estimates, as well as the results of a player fixed effects 
regression for the purpose of comparison.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
We find clear evidence that both a player’s talent and his non-performance-related 
popularity increase his market value. This finding is robust across all specifications. 
Regarding the talent indicators, we see that the number of goals; the number of clearances, 
blocks, and interceptions; and the saves to shots ratio significantly increase the star’s market 
value in all considered quantiles.  
If a star player at the 95% quantile scores one more goal per season, his market value 
increases by 4.5%. The coefficients in the quantile regressions are similar in magnitude to 
those in the OLS or fixed effects specification. Thus, the relative marginal effects are more or 
less constant. The absolute size of the marginal talent effect is magnified, however, as we 
move up the market value distribution.16 An additional goal scored by a superstar at the 95% 
quantile, for example, increases his market value by €0.25 million (0.045*5.5 million), 
whereas the absolute increase of an additional goal scored by an average player is worth only 
€0.06 million (0.040*1.5 million). If a mediocre goalkeeper improves his saves to shots ratio 
by 1%, his market value increases by €0.006 million (0.01*0.37*1.5 million). A 1% 
improvement on the part of a star goalkeeper, however, leads to an increase of €0.027 million 
(0.01*0.49*5.5 million).17 At first glance, these findings seem weird, as it should not matter 
who scores the goals or prevents the opposition team from scoring. Going back to the 
superstar theory of Rosen (1981), the magnification effect can be explained by the imperfect 
substitutability of higher and lower talent. Thus, from the consumer’s perspective, one player 
scoring 10 goals is not the same as ten players scoring one goal each. This implies that 
                                                
16 The magnification does not apply to the popularity effect, however, as we measure a player’s popularity 
with the logarithm of the non-performance-related press citations. Hence, the popularity coefficient has to be 
interpreted as elasticity. Adler (1985) does not necessarily assume a convex relationship between a star’s salary 
and popularity. 
17 The magnitudes of the effects prove plausible when analyzing team revenues and revenue performance 
sensitivity in German soccer (see second robustness analysis in section VII). 
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additional talent is magnified into larger earning differences at the top end of the scale than at 
the bottom end. We have to be cautious, however, with generalizations regarding the exact 
magnitudes of the quantile effects: a player who happens to be in a specific quantile of a 
conditional distribution will not necessarily find himself in the same quantile if his 
independent variables change (Buchinsky 1998). 
Whenever correlational designs are used, concerns about internal validity such as 
possible reverse causality may be raised. The issue of reverse causality (impact of market 
values on talent or popularity) is, however, appeased by the lag structure of our model. The 
independent variables are determined during the season, whereas the dependent variable is 
estimated at the end of the past season prior to a new season. The market values should 
therefore be influenced by the player’s talent and popularity and not vice versa. Since we 
have a typical microeconomic dataset with a large cross-sectional dimension and a small time 
dimension, adaptions of Granger causality tests to panel data, for example those formulated 
by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), are not suitable in our context. Granger causality 
is an intrinsically dynamic concept (Attanasio, Picci, and Scorcu 2000). 
 
VII. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
In this section, we perform three different sensitivity analyses. First, we test the 
robustness of the results if the market value proxies of a second independent source are used. 
Secondly, we examine the plausibility of the talent coefficients by relating field performance 
to the team’s winning percentage and the winning percentage to the team’s revenue. Thirdly, 
we explore whether talent and popularity effects are different depending on the tactical 
position of a player.  
 
Different Data Source of the Players’ Market Values 
At the end of the 2004/05 season, we collected a cross-sectional sample of market value 
estimates of all players who appeared in the season for at least half an hour (in total, 427 
players) from www.transfermarkt.de. As Transfermarkt does not provide archive data, market 
values of players in earlier or later seasons were unfortunately not available. As with the 
Kicker market values, the market values from Transfermarkt are estimated by industry 
experts and include not only salaries but also signing fees, bonuses and transfer fees. Table 6 
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shows that the significantly positive talent and popularity effects remain robust when taking 
www.transfermarkt.de as the data source for the dependent variable. The coefficients are 
slightly higher than in the Kicker panel sample, but the general empirical findings of the last 
section are confirmed throughout. Thus, our results are not driven by peculiarities of the 
Kicker proxies. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Revenue Performance Sensitivity 
The basic unit of competition in our context is the team. The star’s talent is valuable to 
the team because it increases the team’s winning percentage, which in turn is positively 
associated with the team’s revenue potential. As we have access to detailed revenue data for 
the German soccer teams,18 we want to test the plausibility of the returns to talent in the 
previous section by estimating revenue performance sensitivity at the team level. In doing so, 
we follow a procedure outlined by Scully (1974). He suggested first calculating the effect of 
different field performance measures on the team’s winning percentage and then considering 
the impact of the team’s winning percentage on team revenues. In line with Scully (1974), we 
do not examine the influence of popularity on team revenues because, unlike with talent, 
there is no clear measure of team-level popularity. It is unclear how individual publicity 
should be aggregated at the team level.  
In our first step, we relate the team’s winning percentage to the talent indicators as 
described in Table 4 but aggregated at the team level. Running a team fixed effects regression 
including all teams appearing in the highest German soccer league between 2001/02 and 
2005/06 (90 observations and 24 different teams), we find significantly positive coefficients 
for the number of goals scored (coef.=0.0067, std.error=0.0013) and the saves to shots ratio 
(coef.=0.6493, std.error=0.1212).19 No other performance measures have a distinct influence 
on the team’s winning percentage. In a second step, we use proprietary team revenue data and 
relate the revenue to the team’s winning percentage. The underlying hypothesis is that fan 
                                                
18 This data has been provided by courtesy of René Algesheimer, Leif Brandes, and Egon Franck. For a first 
empirical analysis of this data, see Algesheimer, Brandes, and Franck (2009). 
19 Detailed regression results are illustrated in Table 12 in the appendix. This regression differs from the 
team production estimation in section IV because it employs seasonal (not match-level) data and a different set 
of explanatory variables.  
23 
interest and hence revenue is positively affected by team wins (Scully 1974). Since the clubs 
usually renegotiate sponsoring and broadcasting contracts at the beginning of the season, we 
use the winning percentage of the last season as the explanatory variable. Even match day 
revenue is largely influenced by the previous season’s percentage of wins because season 
ticket holders represent around 55% of total match attendees (Bundesliga Report 2009). A 
further argument regarding why we use the winning percentage from the last season relates to 
the very lucrative UEFA Champions League (CL). The top two clubs from the last season 
qualify for the CL and the third-place club from the last season is eligible for the CL 
qualifying round, which provides substantial extra money in the current season.20 Of course, 
a team’s revenue is driven not only by sportive success but also by other factors such as the 
size of the market, the team’s (non-performance-related) star attraction, or stadium capacity. 
By estimating a team fixed effects model, we control for all team aspects that are likely to be 
time-constant—for example, the team’s market potential. Furthermore, we explicitly control 
for the team’s stadium capacity (measured in 1000s) because it may change substantially over 
time due to stadium reconstruction. Previous studies found that stadium capacity significantly 
influences (gate) revenues (e.g., Berri et al. 2004; Brandes et al. 2008). We run separate 
models for total revenue and for the subcategories of match day revenue, sponsoring revenue, 
broadcasting revenue and the revenue from various sources such as transfer fees, rental 
income, and catering and merchandizing income.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 reveals that a 1% increase in the team’s winning percentage increases total 
revenues by 1.18%. The highest revenue performance sensitivities are found (in a decreasing 
order) for broadcasting revenue (175%), match day revenue (163%) and sponsoring revenue 
(137%). Stadium capacity clearly affects the team’s match day revenue but has no significant 
impact on other revenue categories such as sponsoring or broadcasting revenues. Following 
Scully (1974), we approximate the marginal revenue product of goal scoring and the saves to 
shots ratio by multiplying the coefficients of the team production function by the coefficients 
of the revenue function. As the coefficients of the latter are determined in a log-level model, 
                                                
20 In the season 2004/05, the clubs that qualified for the CL received €414.1 million in additional 
broadcasting income and generated substantial extra match day turnover.  
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we multiply the product by the average revenue of a team. Thus, the average marginal 
revenue product for one additional goal scored is 0.0067 multiplied by 1.18 multiplied by the 
average team revenue (€66.2 million), which equals €0.52 million. Similarly, we can derive 
the marginal revenue product if the goalkeeper’s saves to shots ratio improves by 1%. In 
doing so, we achieve a marginal revenue product of €0.51 million (0.01*0.6493*1.18*66.2 
million). From the market value regressions in section VI, we know that one additional goal 
scored increases the star’s market value by €0.25 million, and that a 1% improvement in the 
saves to shots ratio of a star goalkeeper increases his market value by €0.03 million. Hence, 
even though the marginal effects of the talent variables on the star’s market value seem to be 
rather large, they are still substantially lower than the (average) marginal revenue products of 
the same variables. Especially the contributions of goalkeepers seem to be undervalued, a 
finding already shown by Frick (2007). It is dangerous, however, to put much emphasis on 
the exact magnitudes of the effects because they react sensitively to the chosen estimation 
strategy and the explanatory variables included. We know, for example, that not only goal 
scoring and the saves to shots ratio matter for winning, but that their strong influence may 
hide the effects of other important field performance measures such as clearances, blocks, 
and interceptions and shots on target, to mention just some examples. Thus, the marginal 
revenue products of goal scoring and of the saves to shots ratio tend to be overestimated, as 
they also incorporate the positive aspects of other important performance characteristics that 
influence winning. Nevertheless, we can still say that the large impact of a player’s talent on 
his market demand seems to be justified given the high revenue potential and the significant 
revenue performance sensitivity in the highest German soccer league. 
 
Tactical Positions and an Alternative Talent Measure 
Soccer is a very interactive game, with high mutual interaction among all players on the 
field. There is no clear distinction between offense and defense, as in baseball, and the 
players’ roles are less narrowly circumscribed than in (American) football. However, soccer 
players are still assigned to a certain tactical position. Besides the specific task of the 
goalkeeper as the ultimate defender of the team, the ten outfield players are generally 
categorized as defenders, midfielders and attackers. Whereas the main task of the offensive 
players (attackers and midfielders) is goal scoring, defensive players (goalkeepers and 
defenders) should primarily prevent goals scored by the opposition team, although even 
goalkeepers score goals and attackers clear the ball at the own goal line once in a while. So 
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far, we have assumed a uniform relationship between the different performance categories 
and the market values for all tactical positions. However, it is likely that not all talent 
indicators are equally important for the different tactical positions. In the following, we run 
separate regressions for offensive and defensive players in order to allow for tactical-specific 
slope coefficients among the performance variables. In the subsample including only the 
offensive players (attackers and defenders), we exclude the variables characterizing typical 
defense qualities (clearances, blocks, and interceptions, as well as the saves to shots ratio), 
whereas the offensive talent measures (goals, assists, shots on target, shots off target) are 
excluded when analyzing the goalkeepers and defenders. Otherwise, we employ the same 
variables and econometric approaches as before. Table 8 illustrates the estimation results of 
the OLS specification and the 95% quantile regression.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
The first two columns in Table 8 reveal that both talent and popularity clearly increase 
the market values of offensive players. The number of goals and assists scored, as well as the 
popularity measure, exerts a significant positive influence. The talent indicators display high 
joint significance. The magnitudes of the effects are very similar to the results in Table 5, 
perhaps with one exception: receiving a red card, which is expected to decrease a star’s 
market value, in fact increases the market demand of offensive star players.  
The two columns on the right in Table 8 show that the talent indicators are no longer 
jointly significant when one is analyzing only defenders and goalkeepers, whereas the 
popularity effect is comparably higher in defense than for offense. Is talent irrelevant for stars 
playing defense? We doubt it. We rather assume that the performance of forwards is more 
visible and better measureable than the contributions of defensive players whose task is 
fuzzier and thus more difficult to capture. Even though the Opta statistics are very precise, 
they represent a quantitative rather than qualitative point of view, ignoring blurry aspects like 
good position play, creativity of play or key player attitudes. Reinstein and Snyder (2005) 
argue that expert opinions may serve as important “product” information revealing otherwise 
uncertain quality aspects. We therefore test expert appraisals as a different approach to 
measuring a player’s talent. The overall match performance of each player who plays more 
than half an hour in the highest German soccer league is consistently evaluated and marked 
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by sports experts, using the German grading scale that varies between 1.0 (excellent) and 6.0 
(very bad). The individual match evaluations are published on the webpage www.kicker.de.21 
We collected all match evaluations for all players appearing in the highest German soccer 
league during the considered time frame (2001/02 to 2005/06). For ease of interpretation, we 
transformed the original marks by subtracting the original mark from 7. A player’s talent, 
then, is defined by the average mark a player receives during a season. In Table 9, we replace 
the quantitative performance statistics with more qualitative expert evaluations.  
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
Using expert evaluations as a talent indicator, we again find strong influences of both 
talent and popularity, regardless of whether offensive or defensive players are analyzed. 
Looking at the magnitudes of the effects, we notice that defensive players have comparably 
higher returns to popularity and lower returns to talent than do offensive (star) players.22  
 
VIII. DISCUSSION 
An empirical validation of the different superstar theories proposed by Rosen (1981) 
and Adler (1985) requires valid and quantifiable talent measures. This paper argues that 
tournaments in professional sports help to determine the (relative) talent of an athlete, which 
is otherwise unobserved and therefore hard to identify. The label of “winner” does not entail 
a subjective impression, but rather results from a clearly defined competition in a controlled 
environment. In team production settings, in which teams and not individuals compete 
against each other, the situation is a little more complicated. In this case, a player’s talent is 
considered his contribution to the team output. Thus, we first estimated a team production 
function to detect critical playing elements impacting team success, which are taken as talent 
indicators in the market value regression. A player’s non-performance-related popularity is 
                                                
21 If the experts really gave harsher ratings to stars than to non-stars, as some people believe, the playing 
talent of stars would be underestimated using the Kicker expert evaluations. We also have to be aware of 
potential single source bias.   
22 As the function relating a player’s talent and popularity to market values could involve non-additive 
patterns, we also tested for interaction effects. The interaction term between expert evaluations as talent proxy 
and the non-performance-related press citations as a popularity indicator was insignificant in all specifications, 
however.   
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defined by the residuals of a regression of the logarithm of individual press citations relating 
to the player’s performance. Running different quantile regressions, we find evidence that 
both talent and non-performance-related popularity contribute to the market value 
differentials in the highest German soccer league. Since the market value proxies we used do 
not include individual endorsement fees, our estimates may be considered as lower bounds. 
Endorsement fees usually react very sensitively to the athlete’s talent and popularity.   
A robustness analysis reveals that the impacts of talent and popularity are robust when 
using a different source of market value proxies and that the effects apply to both offensive 
and defensive star players. In the case of the offense, slightly higher returns to talent are 
found than for the defense, whereas the marginal impact of popularity is comparably higher 
in the case of the defense than that of the offense. This finding could indicate that the talent 
effect is higher when quality can be ascertained more easily, and that non-performance-
related popularity is comparably more important for remuneration if quality is more difficult 
to identify and measure. A similar result was found by Wang (2008), who showed that 
scoring performance was more highly rewarded in the NBA than non-scoring performance 
even though the contributions of scoring and non-scoring performance to the team’s winning 
percentage are similar. In addition, we find that the estimated talent coefficients are plausible 
given the high revenue potential and the significant revenue performance sensitivity of 
German soccer teams.  
Of course, further work is required to test the generalizability of our results. A more in-
depth examination of the factors determining the consumer’s decision to buy access to a 
superstar service would be very beneficial. In this paper, we considered (Rosen-style) talent 
as the individual’s ability to impact the likelihood of winning a sports competition. In 
contrast, all non-sportive factors, like celebrity status in the media, were seen as aspects of 
(Adler-style) popularity that also attract fans with something more to consider than the pure 
quality of the game. Adler (1985) sees star popularity as a way of economizing on the costs 
of accumulating consumption capital, which itself increases the perceived quality of the star’s 
service. In this paper, we directly relate the demand for a star’s services to the star’s 
popularity and neglect consumption capital as the theoretical link. However, the relevance 
and conception of consumption capital definitely deserves the future attention of both 
theorists and empiricists.  
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Even though the economic concept of superstars was first developed to describe the 
enormous salaries of individual service providers in the entertainment industries,23 skewed 
earning distributions can be found in many work contexts, the most prominent of which is the 
area of top management compensation. Although we have not specifically addressed the issue 
of “management stars” in our paper, the set-up and framing of our approach could provide 
input for the specific body of literature on the drivers of top management salaries. Our study 
analyzes an individualistic phenomenon (the determinants of a star player’s remuneration) in 
an institutional setting in which teams and not individuals are the basic unit of competition. 
This, of course, complicates the identification of an individual’s contribution to the team 
output. On the other hand, this team production context captures a basic element of 
managerial work, as the superstars in management also emerge from a team production 
setting, where firms and not individuals are the relevant units of competition in markets.  
In 1982, Sherwin Rosen expanded his superstar theory to managerial reward 
distributions across ranks in and among hierarchical firms. He argues that the enormous 
salaries of CEOs are justified if the (superior) abilities of CEOs filter through the entire 
corporation via a chain of command technology and may therefore increase firm productivity 
by more than the amount of their abilities. Empirical studies, however, contest a pure Rosen-
type explanation of CEO salaries: Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show that CEOs are 
paid not only for their performance but also based on luck, which means that CEOs receive 
pay premiums associated with profit increases that are entirely generated by external factors 
such as changes in oil prices and exchange rates. Further empirical studies find considerable 
“popularity” effects: Lee (2006) shows that the press coverage of a CEO increases his/her 
salary even after controlling for the firm’s performance. Malmendier and Tate (forthcoming) 
and Wade, Porac, Pollock, and Graffin (2006) relate a CEO’s reputation to the CEO’s 
compensation and subsequent firm performance. Both papers find that CEOs receive higher 
remuneration after winning a prestigious business award and that the ex-post consequences 
for firm performance are negative. Hence, superstar CEOs tend to be paid not only for their 
managerial ability but for other factors beyond performance as well. Furthermore, the 
correlations between a star manager’s talent and popularity and between firm performance 
and popularity are, unlike in professional sports, not necessarily positive but indeed often 
negative. Celebrity CEOs may indulge in activities that provide little firm value, such as 
                                                
23 Rosen (1981) uses examples of full-time comedians and classical musicians, and Alder (1985) mentions 
singing and painting as artistic activities generating superstars.  
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writing books, sitting on outside boards or playing golf (Malmendier and Tate forthcoming). 
Also CEOs receiving great media praise may become overconfident about the efficiency of 
their past actions and future abilities (Hayward, Rindova, and Pollock 2004). Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) show that CEOs who enjoyed high press publicity paid larger premiums for 
acquisitions due to CEO hubris.  
Even though both talent and popularity effects seem highly relevant for top 
management compensation, the specific literature mostly fails to make a clear distinction 
between the two effects, probably because valid and measurable indicators of managerial 
ability are hard to find. Our paper suggests that future empirical research on top management 
compensation should first try to proxy managerial ability by estimating a firm production 
function before other drivers of CEO salaries like popularity can be properly isolated.  
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Notes: Figure 1 illustrates nonparametric kernel estimates of the distribution of the log10 of individual market value 
proxies published in the Kicker soccer magazine. The sample size is 1370. We used an Epanechnikov kernel and “optimal” 
bandwidth.  
 
